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PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS: HEDGE FUNDS'
REGULATION BY SIZE
Tamar Franker
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on hedge funds-a species of private investment
funds. These funds appeared in the 1950s and remained active but small.
Then, in a fairly short period, they grew enormously to over $1.5 trillion,
although the estimates vary. 1 Hedge fund managers engage in more than
twenty-five different categories of investment strategies.2 Since 2002, the
number of hedge funds has more than doubled to an estimated 9,000 funds,3
and their assets have grown by 400% to an estimated $1.4 trillion since
1999.4 Other estimates are higher, suggesting current hedge fund assets at $2
trillion and their number worldwide at 13,000, although the United States

Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University. I am
*
indebted to Claudia F. Torres, J.D., Boston University Law School, for the research in her
paper Managing the Excessive Use of Leverage by Hedge Funds, written in satisfaction of a
seminar, Investment Company Regulation, Fall 2007. I am also indebted to Sofia
Tsachouridou, LL.M., Boston University, for her meticulous and expansive research.
I.
In July 2007 the number of hedge funds was estimated to be about 9,000. Their
assets have grown by 400% to about $1.4 trillion since 1999. Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk:
Perspectivesfrom the President's Working Group on FinancialMarkets: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on FinancialServs., 110th Cong. 61-66 (2007) (statement of Robert K. Steel,
Treasury Under Secretary For Domestic Finance) [hereinafter Steel Testimony]; see also SEC.
& EXCH. COMM., Div. OF INV. MGMT. & OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS vii (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
2.
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 34 n. 120.
3.
Steel Testimony, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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market accounts for 70% of the funds' assets. 5 The different estimates may
be due to the fact that these funds are not required to report as much as other
regulated pools of assets are, that the funds are absorbing assets globally, and
that their investor and lender base has grown. The number of funds does not
represent their asset concentration, however. "The average size of a hedge
fund, however, just exceeds $100 million. Thus, ten percent of the hedge
funds hold about ninety percent of the total hedge fund assets." 6 Hedge fund
managers engage in many different investment strategies. 7 But their size has
increased by borrowing and by a variety of indirect leveraging techniques,
such as short positions, futures, repurchase agreements, options, and other
derivative contracts. 8 In addition, there is also a growing concern over the
retailization of hedge funds. 9 Hedge funds have reached small
investors'
0
money indirectly by attracting mutual funds and pension funds.'
Some hedge funds have produced enormous profits for their investors
and their managers. Other funds have suffered significant losses due to
fraud,l and12 some have generated devastating losses by speculation and risky
structures.

This symposium poses the questions of whether private funds should be
regulated, and whether the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
should increase the level of its regulation over these funds. The attempts of
the SEC to regulate the managers of hedge funds have been only partially
successful. 13
5. Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market
Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 1, 12-16 (2007).
6. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
7. Id.at 17.
8. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
9. Id.at 80.
10. Id. at 81-83.
11. See, e.g., Anuj Gangahar, FormerHedge FundChiefJailedfor20 Years, FIN. TIMES
(USA Edition 2), Jan. 30, 2008, at 17 ("The former finance chief of bankrupt hedge fund
company Bayou Management was yesterday sentenced to 20 years in prison, among the
harshest sentences meted out in the US for a white-collar crime, for his part in defrauding
investors of more than [$400m]."); Lori Montgomery, 2 FormerTreasury Chiefs Add Clout to
Hedge Funds, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2006, at DOI (Amaranth lost an estimated $6.6 billion).
12.

See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,

AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10-22 (1999), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP].

13. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2628, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,761 (proposed Aug. 9,

2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.206(4)-8).
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More importantly, the freedom of hedge funds from regulation is
important to our financial system. 14 The fund managers are the mavericks,
the innovators and risk-takers. They offer experimental and innovative
approaches. Some of these approaches contribute to the efficiency of the
markets. For example, a number of hedge funds trade in "miss-priced assets"
and offer alternative investments to pension funds. These funds perform very
well in market downturns.' 5 Some funds may provide early danger signals,
which are helpful to the markets and the regulators; that is, so long as these
funds do not threaten to undermine the entire financial system. These funds
did not threaten the financial system. That is when the funds remained small
and investors did not clamor to invest in them. So long as they remained
unique and out of the ordinary actors they did not endanger the system.
While there is a need to limit the impact of hedge funds on the financial
system, I suggest that this goal should be achieved by regulating the size of
these funds. Rather than controlling the funds' actions or their actors, it is the
source of these funds' assets that requires control. Hedge funds should
remain free of additional regulation if they remain small in terms of the
amounts that their lenders invest in them. Thus, the necessary regulation of
today's hedge funds should focus on how hedge funds grow in terms of
assets under management, and who enables them to grow in this way.
This Article suggests that the lenders - the banks and large institutional
investors, as well as funds of funds - should be regulated. The regulation of
these institutions should induce them to limit the amounts they offer to
finance hedge funds by requiring the financing to be kept on their books,
prohibiting the sale of this financing and perhaps by increasing the loan loss
reserves; our existing philosophy and method of regulation, falling within the
duties of these financing institutions to their savings investors.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I outlines the regulation of
investment companies and the exceptions that shelter hedge funds from some
regulation. Part II examines the source of hedge funds' growth in the past
few years. Part III describes the fraudulent behavior of some managers of
large hedge funds and the impact of their behavior on the financial system.
Part IV suggests principles on which regulation should be based. It
emphasizes that regulation aims not only, and perhaps not mainly, at
protecting investors as much as it aims at protecting the financial system.
14. Justin Fox, Fearof a Black Box, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 2005, at 72.
Market
Financial
Blundell-Wignall,
15. Adrian
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/56/38674683.pdf (OECD FORUM 2007,
Growth and Equity, May 14-15, 2007, Paris).

Innovation,
Innovation,
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Regulators should keep hedge funds small and relatively free to take risks.
The main lenders and institutional investors should be regulated by reducing
their incentives to finance hedge funds.
II. THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND THE EXCEPTIONS
SHELTERING HEDGE FUNDS

After the U.S. market crash of the late 1920s and the devastating
investors' losses, Congress passed laws to regulate intermediaries over the
entire financial system:18 the securities market actors, 16 the banks,171 and the
investment companies.
In all these statutes Congress provided exceptions, distinguishing
between Wall Street actors that cater to few members of the public and those
that cater to large segments of the public. Congress imposed the highest level
of regulation on the larger actors, and excluded the small ones fully or
partially from regulation. For example, large advisers are required to register
with the SEC. Small advisers, who have less than fifteen clients,1 9 need not
register. Investment companies with less than 100 holders of voting
securities 2° and investment companies whose investors are wealthy and
sophisticated are excluded from the definition of an investment company. 21
Thus, with respect to such exemptions there are no limits both on the assets
under management and the number of investors.
Similarly, Congress imposed strict regulation on market actions that
are widespread, such as public distribution of securities,22 and imposed a
lower level of regulation on more limited distribution of securities such as

16. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000 & Supp. 112002); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
17. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended

in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
18. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -64 (2000 & Supp. II
2002); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
19. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
20. Securities Act of 1933, Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2007); see
generally State of Wisconsin Dep't of Fin. Insts., A Brief History of Securities Regulation,

http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/regexemp/history.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
21. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2007). Courts are
not sympathetic to such investors who decide to invest in risky securities and then sue to
recover their losses. See Moross Ltd. P'ship v. Eckenstein Capital, Inc., 466 F.3d 508 (6th Cir.
2006).
22. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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private placements. 23 These distinctions, however, do not apply to the
amounts involved but to the number of clients or wealth and sophistication of
the investors involved. An unlimited number of banks, for example, may
invest unlimited amounts of money in managed pools of money, such as
hedge funds. However, because banks are subject to strict substantive
regulation on how and where they lend and invest the depositors' and other
investors' money, and must diversify their loan portfolios, there are limits on
the amounts they can invest in hedge funds.
A number of reasons can explain the distinctions between large and
small institutions, whether by number of investors or amounts invested. First,
24
"small" does 11
not mean "less profitable" for investors. Some studies have
25
shown that smaller hedge funds are likely to perform better. Second, when
the number of investors or advisees is small, there is a better likelihood that
they will be wealthier. Otherwise, the advisers might not find it sufficiently
lucrative to operate their business. It is presumed that such wealthy
individuals are more sophisticated and that they can fend better for
26
themselves. It is very likely that the clients will directly interact with the
managers of their money. Such direct contact is likely to allow investors
more control over their money managers. Third, dishonest fund managers,
who manage the assets of a larger number of investors, can inflict harm on
individual investors. The larger the number of individual investors, the
greater the harm they can inflict. Fourth, the larger the number of investors
is, the more harm can be inflicted on the entire financial system. As Andy
Serwer wrote in Fortune about the impact of the financial system on citizens:
"Don't for a minute think that this doesn't apply to you. The hedge fund
boom has sweeping implications not just for Wall Street traders and a few

23. See generally Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to Private Placements,
http://www.seclaw.com/docs/pplace.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
24. Greg N. Gregoriou & Fabrice Rouah, Large Versus Small Hedge Funds: Does Size
Affect Performance?, J.ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, Winter 2002, at 75; see also James R.
Hedges, IV, Size vs. Performance in the Hedge Fund Industry, 10 J.FIN. TRANSFORMATION
14, 16-17 (2004), available at http://www.edge-fund.com/Hedg.pdf; Christine Williamson,
Midsize Funds of Funds Outperform Big, Small, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 12, 2007, at
45. But see Noel Amenc et al., The Alpha and Omega of Hedge Fund Performance
Measurement 26 (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.edge-fund.com/AmCM03.pdf.
25. Mila Getmansky, Process of Growth of a Hedge Fund: Impact of Size on
Performance, http://systemdynamics.org/conferences/2001/papers/Getmansky_l.pdf
(last

visited Mar. 4, 2008).
26. This language is borrowed from SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125
(1953) ("[T]hose who are shown to be able to fend for themselves ....
").
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thousand well-heeled investors, but27 increasingly for every American
businessperson, investor, and retiree.,
Disloyal managers of large populated funds can inflict harm not only
because the amounts under management are large and not only because they
can injure a larger number of investors. Such managers and the reactions of
their victims can contaminate other, healthy, institutions and thereby threaten
the integrity and sustainability of the financial system as a whole. For
example, the contraction of the banking system is the main reason for the
government's establishment of the FDIC to guarantee bank deposits.28
Deposits are expected to be low risk; people would say-"as safe as money
in the bank." If one bank fails, depositors are likely to "run over" other banks
as well. 29 Bubbles and crashes in the markets exhibit the same phenomenon.
Not all investors make their decisions independently of the actions of others,
even if the investors are offered relevant information. That is especially so if
the investments are expected to be safe. Many investors follow others, rather
than evaluate and decide on their own. In some respects, these investors are
rational and efficient. Rather than invest time and attention in evaluating
market prices, they rely on others, whom they believe have done their
homework, and, like free riders, follow the trend.3 °
A similar sensitivity to size is demonstrated by the requirement that
certain large investors of publicly held companies disclose their identity.3'
Professor Mark Roe has suggested that diversification, required by the tax
code to allow mutual funds to avoid double taxation, was based on the
concern that Wall Street might grow sufficiently large and control Main
Street.32
Where do hedge funds fit in the regulatory scheme? The term "hedge
funds" is not defined in law,33 except by the extent to which they are
27. Andy Serwer, Where the Money's Really Made, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2003, at 106.
28. Robert L. Hetzel, Too Big to Fail: Origins, Consequences,and Outlook, ECON. REv.
(Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond), Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 3, 5-6, available at
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic-research/economic-review/pdfs/er77060
1.pdf.
29. George G. Kaufman, Bank Runs: Causes, Benefits, and Costs, 7 CATO J. 559, 56163 (1988), availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj7n3/cj7n3-2.pdf.
30. See Shane Oliver, Its [sic] All in the Mind - Investor Psychology (Oct. 9, 2002),
http://www.ampcapital.co.nz/MarketViews/Economic/Investmentpsychology.pdf"
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 13d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-l(a) (2007).
32. Mark J. Roe, PoliticalElements in the Creationof a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1469, 1478-79 (1991).
33. GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION
AND COMPLIANCE § 1:1, Westlaw, SEC Hedge Database (last updated Nov. 2007).
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regulated. They are "an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps
other assets, whose interests are not sold in a registered public offering and
which is not registered as an investment company under the Investment
Company Act. '34 Hedge funds have escaped strict investment companies'
and securities' regulation by following the exceptions in the law (e.g., the
limits on the number and quality of advisees and investors and offerees of
securities). However, the SEC has continuously been attentive to them. 35 "As
early as 1969, the Commission investigated hedge funds ....
Thus, functionally, hedge funds fall within the definition of an
investment company because they issue securities and invest in securities.37
However, these funds are exempted from registration as investment
companies under either section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7) of the Investment
Company Act.38 To qualify for exemption under section 3(c)(1), a hedge
fund may not be beneficially owned by more than 100 persons. 39 To qualify
for exemption under section 3(c)(7), a hedge fund may sell its securities only
to qualified purchasers. 4° Further, to qualify for exemption under either
section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7), the hedge fund must not make or propose
to make a public offering of its securities.41
Therefore, it is up to creditors, counterparties, and hedge funds
themselves to place limits on the amount of leverage that hedge funds use.42
In recent years, small investors' money could reach hedge funds through
registered funds that distribute their securities to the public but invest their
34. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
35. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,171, 45,174 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
36. Id.
37. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2000) defines an
investment company as an issuer which "is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities." Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C) (2000) defines an
investment company as an issuer that "is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of [its] total
assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis." See
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 11 (concluding that most hedge funds meet both of these
definitions). See generally Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds and Funds of
Hedge Funds (Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm.
38. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2000).
39. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000).
40. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000).
41. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2000).
42. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 4-5.
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assets in hedge funds.43 Thus, public investors' money does seep through to
hedge funds through the pools in which the public invests its money.
Hedge funds are free of a number of constraints which apply to publicly
held investment companies. One important constraint is the prohibition on
borrowing. The law prohibits investment companies from borrowing, with
very few limited exceptions. 44 The concern about excessive borrowing by
investment companies led to the passage of section 18 of the Investment
Company Act. 45 Before the Act, some investment companies were highly

leveraged,46 resulting often in highly speculative investments.4 7 Section 18 of
the Investment Company Act 48 imposes asset coverage requirements upon
the issuance of senior securities.49
Open-end investment companies are prohibited from issuing or selling
any class of senior security, 50 and may only borrow from banks, subject to a
300% asset coverage requirement.5 While the Investment Company Act
does not prohibit mutual funds from investing in any specific type of
instrument, including derivatives, mutual funds must disclose information
about these transactions and their risks in the prospectus. 52

43. After Blackstone: Should Small Investors be Exposed to Risks of Hedge Funds?
Testimony Before the Domestic Policy Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform 3-4 (July 11, 2007) (statement of Peter J. Tanous), available at
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20070712164945.pdf.

44. Allan F. Conwill, Director, SEC Div. Corp. Regulation, Protection or Oppression?
The Investment Company Act Impact on the Publicly Held SBIC (Oct. 3, 1963), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1963/100363conwil.pdf;

see also Sarbanes-Oxley to Impose

Restrictions on Publicly Held Companies: Compliance Costs May Increase More than 100%,
Bus. WIRE, May 27, 2003.
45. SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 76-279, pt.
3 (1939).
46. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N Div. OF INV. MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF
CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 80 (1992).
47. Id.
48. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2000).
49. 3 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS § 21.05[C], at 21-92 (2d ed. 2001); see also
Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: Market
Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235, 287-93 (2006) (the operations of large

investment companies (e.g., mutual funds) are currently regulated, and these regulations seem
sufficient to protect the financial system, notwithstanding the scandals in which mutual funds
have been recently involved).

50. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(l) (2000); SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N Div. OF INV. MGMT, supra note 46, at 432.

51. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (2000).
52. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at app. 2.
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Hedge funds are not required to maintain maximum leverage ratios under
the Investment Company Act because they are structured so as to qualify for
exclusion from registration as investment companies under the Act." Since
hedge funds are not confined by the leverage and borrowing restrictions that
apply to registered investment companies under the Act, hedge funds are free
to use large amounts of leverage to engage in risky investments.54 In fact,
hedge funds often use leverage aggressively. At the extreme, hedge funds
leverage their capital thirty times, 55 or even fifty or more as in the case of
Long-Term Capital Management.56
In addition, there are a number of trading techniques that regulated
investment companies may not practice. Most importantly, hedge funds need
not disclose their investment policies and how they trade, while regulated
investment companies must disclose these policies.
Historically, hedge funds traded in the securities markets. They adopted
various trading strategies designed to capture the inefficiencies in the
markets. And they borrowed, thus increasing their returns as well as their
risks. When one trades successfully on borrowed money, one can increase
the returns by capturing the profits minus the cost of the borrowing.
However, if the trading is unsuccessful, the losses not only affect one's
investment; the fund must pay the lenders the borrowed amounts and the
interest due. In addition, speculative trading can turn into gambling ("I am
sure to win this time!") and such gambling can turn into an addiction ("Just
one more time and I will regain my losses!"). Examples, such as the
Amaranth hedge fund and Bear
Stearns funds, have demonstrated such a
58
behavior and such an addiction.
In recent years hedge funds have turned to acquiring corporations that
are rich in cash but slow in rising profits and share prices. Some funds turned
such corporations into more profitable businesses long-term; others have
53. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2000); PRESIDENT'S
1-2.
supra note 12, at app. 1.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Barry Eichengreen & Bokyeong Park, Hedge Fund Leverage Before and After the
Crisis,
J.
ECON.
INTEGRATION
5
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-eichengr/research/hedgefunddec20.pdf.
57. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8(b)(1), (2) (2000); see SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181-82 (1963); see also Westly Callsfor
IncreasedDisclosureand Transparencyfor Hedge Funds, Bus. WIRE, May 12, 2003.
58. Carl Bialik, BillionaireNBA Owner's Gamble on a Hedge Fund Faces Long Odds,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/BETTINGMEDIA/WSJ_
9Dec2004.htm.
WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at app.
54. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP,
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turned their acquired corporations into more profitable operations short-term,
but depleted the corporations long-term. 59 The main point is that, throughout
their history, hedge funds have adopted various trading techniques, invested
in various corporations, and were successful as well as unsuccessful. Some
behaved with integrity and some turned out to be the rogue actors on Wall
Street.
III. THE SOURCE OF HEDGE FUNDS GROWTH IN THE PAST FEW YEARS

A. How did Hedge Funds Grow to Such an Extent?
The first hedge fund, distinguished from other pooled funds by its
60
investment strategy, was established in 1948, by Alfred Winslow Jones.
Others followed this strategy, and by 1968, the number of similar hedge
funds grew to be nearly two hundred. 6' In the 1990s, their number and assets
under management exploded. If hedge funds were subject to limits on the
number and quality of investors, and if for so many years their size was
minimal as compared to other publicly held managed investment pools, how
did their assets under management grow to such an extent during the past ten
years? Before the year 2000, most hedge fund investors were wealthy
individuals. Since then, institutional investors, such as pension funds,
endowment funds, and sovereign wealth funds, have invested in hedge funds.
Infusion of money
increased their size and raised the complexity of hedge
62
fund groups.
One reason for their rapid growth may be the funds' spectacular
performance. This performance was remarkable as compared to the declining
59. Andrew Dolbeck, Hedging Bets on Acquisitions: Hedge Funds and M&A, WEEKLY
CoRP.
GROWTH
REP.,
Aug.
2,
2004,
at
1-2,
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3 7 5 5/is_200408/ai n9422950.
60. Jonathan J. Katz, Note, Barbarians At The Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to
Acquire Low Cost CorporateInfluence and Its Effect on ShareholderApathy, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1483, 1492 (2006).
61. Id at 1493.
62. Deborah Brewster, As Hedge Funds Swell So Do Demands on Brokers, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2b0a0de-c242-11 dc-8fba0000779fd2ac.html; see also Tim Price, Why You Should Be Wary of Hedge Funds,
MONEYWEEK, Mar. 30, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.moneyweek.com/file/10589/whyyou-should-be-wary-of-hedge-funds.html. Some argued, however, that hedge funds that
carried pension fund investments managed lower risk portfolios. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP, supra note 12, at 1; Steve Rosenbush, Hedge Funds Inc., Bus. WK., May 23, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2007/db20070522571588.htm.
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market prices in the early 2000s. This performance was achieved in large
part by leveraging, that is, "the use of credit to enhance one's speculative
capacity ''63 or more broadly: the risk taken as compared with the ability to
bear it, 64 or the ratio of assets to net worth. 65 Hedge funds leverage by using
strategies that create greater exposure to risk and benefit than the invested
amount, 66 such as buying securities with borrowed money.67 In this Article, I
focus only on borrowing, that is, not on the rise in risk but on the rise in
hedge funds' assets under management.
Thus, the main source of hedge funds' enormous returns was increased
borrowing. Some borrowing was direct, but new types of speculation by
investing in various derivatives, for example, increased the assets far more.
"Hedge Funds [that] have been around for a long time [have grown to about]
$1.4 trillion in mid 2007. But the leverage hedge funds use alongside of this
is much bigger. [The writer estimated that leverage] could
be well over $5
68
account."
into
properly
taken
are
derivatives
if
trillion,
B. Where is the Source of Hedge Funds' Borrowing?
Hedge funds rarely borrow from individuals. The exemptions under
which they function prohibit them from publicly offering securities,
including bonds. Besides, the hedge funds' individual investors and
institutions invest in equity securities, rather than bonds. Thus, hedge funds'
sources of borrowed capital are the banks, investment bankers, large broker
dealers and underwriters. In the last analysis, the public's deposit and savings
money has in fact found its way into, and caused the enormous growth of,
hedge funds (and other private funds).69

63.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

687 (10th ed. 1993).

64. Dr. John Kambhu, Banking Supervision and Government Policy: Intermediation in
Today's FinancialMarkets, 4 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 41, 44 (1999).

65. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 4.
66. George A. Martin, Assoc. Dir., CISDM, University of Massachusetts, Getting
Exposure:

Hedge

Funds,

Leverage,

and

Derivatives

3,

http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/resources/pdffiles/2005/Conference/Martin-I -2005.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2008).
67. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 37. Today, hedge funds increase leverage by
methods that do not appear on the balance sheet (e.g., short positions, futures, repurchase
agreements, options, and other derivative contracts).
68. Blundell-Wignall, supra note 15 (emphasis added).

69. Hedge funds that held securities backed by subprime mortgage loans lost significant
amounts, especially if their investments were highly speculative. See Ashley Seager, Even
Armageddon Has a Silver Lining, THE GuARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2007, at 24.
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Thus, while in the past the main source of funding for hedge funds was
wealthy investors, and to a lesser extent lenders, during the past ten years
the source of lending has expanded dramatically. Banks have considered
hedge funds to be valuable customers and have lent to hedge funds enormous
amounts.7 ° Since 2001, banks have been competing to lend to hedge funds,
offering these funds loans at an increasingly high leverage ratio. The funds'
equity amounts were falling, and the "cushion" for the banks' loans was
falling as well. The source of hedge fund loans expanded to foreign
countries. Japan, for example, was often mentioned as a source of low
interest loans. 7' Another example is the Long-Term Capital Fund. At the end
of its life, the leverage ratio of this fund's assets turned out to be $1
investment for every $25 of borrowed money.72 When the Russian
government defaulted on its bonds, 73 the Fund failed, causing very serious
losses to a number of banks. The lenders and investors bore the heavy
burden. Because the lenders were banks and other regulated lending
institutions, the government intervened to support coverage of the losses.74
Otherwise, the financial system may have been adversely affected. 75 In 2001,
the Federal Reserve Board lowered the interest rates for banks to 1%. This
move caused refinancing capacity to rise and allowed hedge funds to grow.
Hedge funds allowed managers to reap a significant amount by participating
in the profits of their fund's investments. The gains provided a strong
incentive
to continue increasing profits by borrowing to increase investment
76
assets.

70. Marian Micu, Determinantsof InternationalBank Lending to Emerging Market
Countries 4-5 (May
11, 2007), http://www.dallasfed.org/news/researchl2007/
07crossbordermicu.pdf, see also Bank Lending to and Other Transactions with Hedge
Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Credit of the
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (March 24, 1999), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba55787.000/hba55787_0.HTM.
71. Jim Jubak, Drowning in Cheap Money, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/
Investing/JubaksJournallDrowningInCheapMondy.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
72. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 12.
73. Id.
74. Id. at D- 1.
75. Grace Wong, An Era of Cheap Money - Gone, CNNMONEY.COM, June 14, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/14/markets/cheapmoneygone/index.htm?postversion=20070
61414 (stating that a rise in global interest rates after a period of historically low interest rates
signals the end of an era of cheap money).
76. Rich Miller & Jesse Westbrook, Hedge-Fund Borrowing Examined by Fed, SEC,
European Regulators, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&refer=home&sid=aMFZqx2S I aWg; see also Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, As
Funds Leverage Up, Fears of Reckoning Rise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2007, at Al. However,
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The regulators in the U.S. and the U.K. expressed worries about the
quality of these loans and about the fact that the banks were not receiving
sufficient security to back these loans. However, only with the severe losses
in subprime loans did regulators begin investigations. The SEC, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the Financial Services Authority in London
are conducting a joint investigation into whether banks and securities firms
set strict enough limits on loans made to hedge funds. 77 The concern is that
competition on borrowers has led to lower lending standards.
Because hedge funds are not required to disclose their leverage ratio, the
current leverage of hedge funds can only be derived from past information
relating to failed funds. For example, it is known that the impact of the
failure of Long-Term Capital Management Company caused
78 reduced credit
for hedge funds which led to lower leverage ratio and size.
IV. ROGUE BEHAVIOR OF HEDGE FUNDS

Hedge funds experiment and innovate. Some funds have refined trading
techniques. Others have moved to acquire or affect corporations that have
potential for short-term profits. 79 Only a few hedge funds have taken the
long-term route. 80 The creativity of hedge funds is undeniable, but that does
currently, the Bank of Japan changed its policy, which suggests that low interest loans from
foreign countries will not be available to the extent they were available until 2006. See Hisane
Masaki, Japan Signals End of World's Cheap Money Era, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 11, 2006,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HClDh01 .html; see also Adrian Ash, Cheap Money
Continues to Wash Across the Globe from Japan, DAILY RECKONING (UK Edition), July 13,

2007,

http://www.dailyreckoning.co.uk/article/cheapmoneycontinuestowashacrosstheglobe

fromjapan0353.html; Mike Larson, The Real Reason for the the [sic] Stock Market Falls Cheap Money from the Bank of Japan, MARKET ORACLE, Mar. 3,
2007,
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article446.html;
Japan to End Cheap Money Policy
Soon:Report, CBC NEWS, July 4, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2006/07/04/japan-

tues.html;
77. Miller & Westbrook, supra note 76.
78. Eichengreen & Park, supra note 56, at 20.
79. See, e.g., Barnet D. Wolf & Jeffrey Sheban, Pensions Driving Takeover Binge;
Inflow of Money, New Attitude Behind Private-EquitySplurge, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 27,

2007, at 1D (noting that hedge funds "tend to be short-term investors that aggressively seek
the biggest returns possible"). The article describes hedge funds acquiring stakes in Wendy's
International Inc. and forcing changes to improve share price.
80. See, e.g., Eric B. Fisher & Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changingface of
Corporate Bankruptcy Practice, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2006/2007) ("While some

hedge funds pursue long-term investment strategies, the liberal redemption policies offered by
most hedge funds require more short-term strategies in order to maintain sufficient fund
liquidity.").
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not mean that the level of fraud posed by such funds has risen. There may
have been more failures resulting from speculation and risk-taking. 8 1 Perhaps
more frauds were caused by the greater temptations which accompanied the
enormous growth of these funds.
Amaranth, a Greenwich, Connecticut based hedge fund,82 reported losses
of $3 billion to $5 billion and was being investigated by Connecticut
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal. Arguably, "Amaranth's losses of
about $5 billion in one week don't appear to be a systemic problem.
'An over
' 83
confident trader, under lax supervision, lost billions of dollars."'
According to the Wall Street Journal, Barclays Bank lost all $400
million that it lent to two big hedge funds managed by Bear Steams Cos. that
collapsed. 84 The bank brought suit against Bear Steams Cos. and two of its
fund managers.85 Barclays argues that it was misled as to the "performance
of the highly leveraged funds. 86 The hedge funds' investors lost $1.6
billion.87 Bear Steams Cos.' position is that the investors and lenders were
sophisticated and knew that the high returns might also result in high
losses.88 The main issue is the time in which the managers of the funds knew
about the funds' problems and to what extent they misled or had to warn the
investors and lenders of the precarious position of the funds.
It is interesting to note that when the SEC proposed to increase the
financial qualification of investors in hedge funds, small investors rose to
protest. 89 For them, hedge funds meant that the rich could get richer, while
they would be barred from the opportunity to become rich. Possible losses
were not counted for much. Perhaps people who do not have much to lose
81. See Eichengreen & Park, supra note 56, at 2 (suggesting that "the use of credit by
highly-leveraged institutions declined significantly in the wake of Russia-LTCM crisis, which
suggested to fund managers, shareholders and counterparties that the risks of highly-leveraged
investment strategies may have been underestimated.").
82. Shaheen Pasha, Amaranth Debacle Raises Cry for Regulation, CNNMONEY.COM,
Sept. 29, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/20O6/09/20/markets/amaranth-hedgefunds/index.htm.
83. Id.
84. Kate Kelly, Barclays Sues Bear Over FailedFunds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2007, at
C3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Bear Sued by Barclays, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Dec. 31, 2007, at 14 ("Bear
describes Barclays as a 'highly sophisticated financial institution with scores of analysts and
economists capable of evaluating investment risk."').
89. Sara Hansard, 200 Have Filed Comments on SEC Hedge Fund Plan, INV. NEWS,
Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dlUarticle?AID=/20070219/FREE/
70216042/1009/TOC.
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are more willing to take risks in the hope of gaining very large amounts.
After all, their losses can result in bankruptcy, and for many that is not a
sufficient deterrent as weighed against the chance of high profits.
V. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATING ACTORS IN THE FINANCIAL
MARKETS

A. Protectingthe Individual Investor and the System
The guiding principles of market regulation in the United States have
aimed at protecting investors who cannot rationally protect themselves.9" For
example, if the information that is necessary for investors to make a rational
decision is generally too costly to acquire and understand, the law might
interfere to require that the information be offered in plain English.9" In
addition, and perhaps more importantly, the purpose of regulation is to
protect the financial system. The protection of investors and the protection of
the system go hand in hand. But the system must be protected even at the
cost of some investors and some managers.
B. How Do We Regulate?
In the 1940s, Congress was not as reluctant as it currently is to dictate
how small investors should invest their money. With time, and with the
rising belief that the market (whatever it is) is the best judge of the quality
and value of investments, Congress has increasingly become more averse to
regulating the manner in which money managers invest. Today, rightly or
wrongly, we believe that the managers must disclose their investment
policies to investors and let the investors and the markets determine the value
and risk level and justified return from investments that follow these policies.
If hedge funds are offered to sophisticated and wealthy investors that can
protect themselves from losses and fraud,92 and if hedge funds do not violate

90. See 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION 94 (3d ed. rev. 1998)
(noting extensive role of government in investor protection).
91. See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,593, Investment Company Release No. 23,011, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6,
1998) (requiring use of plain English in prospectuses).
92. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008)
(providing exemption from registration requirement for certain private resales of securities to
institutions); Moross Ltd. P'ship v. Eckenstein Capital, Inc., 466 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (the
court rejected the claim of a sophisticated investor).
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their fiduciary duties to their investors,93 then, at the most, regulation would
require hedge funds to offer information to investors. Otherwise, the funds
should remain free to adopt investment policies as their managers choose.
Hence, our culture points to freedom of hedge funds to act, subject to a
prohibition on fraud and the requirement of disclosure.
However, we have in the past, and should in the present, regulate the
banks and other lenders or holders of other people's money that is pooled for
efficient investment. Banks and similar institutions are the main source of
our system's liquidity and should not invest in speculative enterprises above
a limited amount. Therefore, banks are required to account for the amounts
they lend and provide backing in the form of loan loss reserves for these
amounts.94 This accounting system reduces bank dividends and bank stock
prices (on which bank management depends for a significant part of their
compensation). 95 Self-interest presses bank management to reduce loan loss
reserves and to remove liabilities off its balance sheet. 96 There are many
ways to do that, and we need not discuss them here. The creative talent of the
accounting profession is boundless, and the regulators are attempting to limit
the techniques which banks use to reduce the loans on their balance sheets.
To be sure, bank management strives to provide profits to its
shareholders. While in the past the number of bank shareholders was
relatively small, many banks are currently publicly held. 97 The pressure to
93. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2000)
(prohibiting investment advisers from engaging in fraudulent acts); Andrew M. Kulpa &
Butzel Long, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game
Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate Control and Governance, 6 U.C. Davis
Bus. L.J. 78, 89 (2005) ("[M]ost types of institutional investors, such as pension funds and
trusts, may owe fiduciary duties to their constituents," hedge funds "do not have any enhanced
legal fiduciary duty to investors because of the private nature of the funds and the resulting
sophistication of the investors.").
94. See, e.g., Loan Loss Reserves: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Banking and FinancialServices, 106th
Cong.
(1999),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/l999/sp 6jun99.html
(statement of Donna Tanoue, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corporation) (defining loan
loss reserves and describing how they are determined).
95. Id. (stating that the establishment of a reserve is "a loss against current earnings"; a
later increase is "an expense to current earnings and, therefore, a reduction in equity capital").
96. See, e.g., Recent Developments in Loan Loss PositioningFRBSF ECON. LETTER
(Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
San
Francisco),
July
25,
1997,
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/e197-21.html ("The loan loss reserve account appears
on a bank's balance sheet as a contra asset -- a deduction from the bank's outstanding loans..
97. According to a 2007 survey, 29% of banks with assets from $100 million to $20
million are publicly held, based on completed questionnaires. GRANT THORNTON, 14TH
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increase profits and thereby bank share prices is rising. In addition, bank
management is compensated by "performance" like any other enterprise.
Hence, the pressures to finance and profit by various means have increased.
Financing hedge funds and private equity funds provided one such means.
C. The Systemic Risk of Market Collapse
Highly leveraged financial institutions such as hedge funds have the
potential of disrupting the financial markets. 98 The collapse of one large fund
or several small funds using leverage could cause the default of obligations
and direct losses for creditors and trading counterparties. 99 The inability of
many debtors to pay their obligations at the same period can cause the
collapse of the entire financial system.10o
Even market participants that are not direct creditors or counterparties of
a defaulting hedge fund may be affected by its default if highly leveraged
investors are overwhelmed by market shock or liquidity shock. When the
investors who are ready to bear high risks disappear, other market
participants can be affected by price changes. 0 1 Falling prices can deepen
uncertainty about credit risk. This1 2uncertainty could cause credit, liquidity,
and economic activity to contract. 0
D. A Number of Hedge Funds that Collapsed Offer Examples of Such
Possibilities
Long-Term Capital Management was a prestigious hedge fund which
10 3
earned "spectacular returns" for its investors on a portfolio of $125 billion.
In 1995 and 1996 this hedge fund produced returns, net of fees, of
approximately 40%, and slightly less than 20% in 1997. °4 However, in order
ANNUAL

SURVEY

OF

BANK

EXECUTIVES

(2007),

http://www.denovobanks.com/downloads/GrantThorntonSurveyBankExecutives_07 .pdf
98. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 12; see also Ivy Schmerken, Credit
Crisis in Sub-Prime Mortgages Affects Hedge Funds Trading in Other Asset Classes,
ADVANCED

TRADING,

Sept.

30,

2007,

http://www.advancedtrading.com/featured/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=201805585&pgno=3
(arguing that hedge fund losses were caused by leveraging).
99. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supranote 12, at 23.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103.
104.

ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 193 (2007).
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 11.
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to profit the fund had to borrow from banks and "leverag[e] its bets" with
over $120 billion. 10 5 It seems that Long-Term Capital "had less than $1
billion in capital to offset positions in securities worth $120 billion and
derivatives with a notional value of $1.3 trillion,"' 1 6 at an estimated onbalance sheet leverage ratio of fifty.' 0 7 The precise level of the leverage is
not known because the financial derivatives were not reflected on the balance
sheet. 108
The size of the fund's assets and the extent of its leverage made LongTerm Capital extremely "vulnerable to [certain] market conditions that
emerged" when Russia defaulted on its debt.' °9 The fund lost nearly $5
billion "practically overnight.""l 0 The losses and its failure to raise new
capital1" endangered Long-Term Capital's ability to meet its cash flow
obligations." 2 At the time, it was estimated that its top seventeen
counterparties would have lost about $3 to $5 billion." 3 The collapse of this
hedge fund could have had extreme adverse consequences for world markets
at the time," 4 and the Federal Reserve was concerned that if the hedge fund
sold all its assets at once, "prices could collapse."'" 5 "That would set off a
chain reaction" of other firms' bankruptcies." 6 Therefore, Bill McDonough,
the head of the New York Federal Reserve, decided to intervene. 1 7 He
convened the "top officials of sixteen of the world's most powerful banks
and investment houses" and induced them to bail out the hedge fund." 8
Fourteen firms finally participated in infusing $3.6 billion in cash into LongTerm Capital to enable it to "dissolve in an orderly way. ' 19
A second example is Amaranth Advisors, LLC, which lost an estimated
20
$6.6 billion in September 2006 - the largest hedge fund loss in history.'
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.

110.
111.

112.
113.
114.
115.

103, at 193.
Eichengreen & Park, supra note 56, at 8.
Id. at 1-2.
GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 194.
GREENSPAN, supra note

PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supranote 12, at 13.
GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 194.
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supranote 12, at 12.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 12.
GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 194.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 193-94.
118. Id. at 194.
119. Id.; PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 17.
120. Lori Montgomery, 2 Former Treasury Chiefs Add Clout to Hedge Funds, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2006, at DOI.
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Amaranth actively traded in natural gas contracts, equities, equity-linked
derivatives, credit derivatives, and bank loans. 12 1 The banks and securities
firms which acted as dealers and counterparties to Amaranth had significant
credit exposures to Amaranth. 122 So did pension funds. California's San
Diego County employee
pension fund lost an estimated $85 million in an
23
Amaranth investment. 1
It should be noted that even though Amaranth's losses in dollar terms
were higher than Long-Term Capital's, the fund's collapse was met with a
"shrug," because the market at the time could easily absorb the losses. 124 In
contrast to Long-Term Capital, Amaranth borrowed far less and had far
smaller positions. 125 "Leverage in [Amaranth's] energy portfolio was 5.21
and 6.56 in its commodity portfolio,"
as compared to Long-Term Capital's
126
fifty.
of
level
leverage
estimated
A third example of high leverage and the effect of its collapse is the case
of three Bear Stearns hedge funds in the summer of 2007127 and in January
2008.128 Together, the three funds lost $2 billion from investments mostly in
the subprime mortgage market. 129 The collapse of these funds was similar to
that of Long-Term Capital. The investment strategy of these funds required
increased borrowing; banks lent the funds about $14 billion, and additional
millions were borrowed by issuing short-term debt. 130 At some point the
121. Annette L. Nazareth, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks
Before the Conference of Business Economists, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2007), availableat
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchO2O8O7aln.htm.
122. Id.
123. Officials Offer Hedge Fund Guidelines, AFX.COM, Feb. 23, 2007.
124. Steven Mufson, Hedge Fund's Collapse Met With a Shrug: Amaranth's Loss in
Natural Gas Gamble Not Seen as Affecting Broader Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2006, at
DOI.
125. Id.
126. Alistair Barr, Amaranth Energy Trades Leveraged Five Times in May, MARKET
WATCH, Sept. 25, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/amaranths-energyportfolio-leveraged-five/story.aspx?guid=%7BOBE8C84D-6245-49FC-93C7-A 1EAB32352D
9%7D. However, leverage in energy, particularly in natural gas, is unusual because of the high
volatility. See also Ashley Seager, Even Armageddon Has a Silver Lining, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 13, 2007, at 24. ("The crisis affecting markets around the world means a healthier
sharing of risks.").
127. Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007,
at 50.
128. Bear Steams Shuts Asset-Backed Hedge Fund After Loss, FIN. WEEK, Jan. 10,
2008, http://www.fmancialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080110/REG/172666948/
1014/NEWS.
129. Goldstein & Henry, supra note 127.
130. Id.
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' 31
funds bought "$60 worth of securities for every $1 of investors' money."'
When the lenders began to demand repayment, "the funds held only about
1% of their assets in cash."'132 These examples demonstrate the effect of
borrowing on the stability of the financial system, including institutional
lenders, such as the banks.

E. ProposedSolutions
There are numerous proposals to solve the leverage problem. One
proposal calls for imposing leverage limitations on hedge funds by
subjecting them to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940.133
The Act requires investment companies to maintain a very low maximum
leverage ratio. 134 Congress could implement this proposal by amending the
Investment Company Act to require that all funds exempted from registration
under 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act must comply with
the leverage restrictions of section 18 of the Act. 135 This leverage ratio would
reduce systemic risk that hedge funds have 1created
because the funds would
36
have sufficient assets to pay off obligations.
Another proposal is to impose leverage restrictions based on non-balance
sheet methods of measuring leverage.' 37 Such leverage restrictions would be
based on a "ratio of potential gains and losses relative to net worth" (e.g.,
"value-at-risk relative to net worth"). 138 This method might capture risks
39
which are not reflected on the balance sheet.
Third, small (retail) investors need either additional protections from the
misused leverage by hedge funds, or for the indirect sale of hedge fund
investment to small investors to be discontinued.14

131.
132.

Id.
Id.

133.
Sean M. Donahue, Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: The Amended Investment
Advisers Act Does Not Protect Investors from the Problems Created by Hedge Funds, 55
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 235, 261 (2007).

134. Id. at 265-66.
135. Id. at 266.
136. Id.
137.
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 24.
138. Id.
139. See Goldstein & Henry, supra note 127 (arguably, the level of leverage used by
the Bear Steams hedge funds in the latest round of hedge fund collapses points to continued
misuse of leverage by hedge funds).
140.
Donahue, supra note 133, at 264-66.
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The debate on regulating hedge funds has resurfaced with "vigor"
recently. 141 Dr. John Kambhu notes the arguments against direct regulation
of hedge funds, especially the regulation of leverage by imposing "leverage
ratios." After all, different investors have different risk tolerance. 42 Some
investors seek restricted exposure to leverage but others could tolerate a
higher risk level. Alan Greenspan has stated that "[i]mposing a blanket of
costly regulation will succeed only in stifling the enthusiasm for seeking
niche profits.', 143 In his opinion, regulation would cause the disappearance of
hedge funds. 44 Similarly, if the same leverage ratio imposed on investment
companies under section 18 of the Investment Company Act 45 applied to
hedge funds, 46 they might become indistinguishable from investment
companies. Besides, there are leveraging techniques that are not reflected on
the balance sheet. 147 For example, derivative securities raising liabilities
several times the value of the initial margin that the trader taking that
position must put up, that never show up on the balance sheet. 148 For this
reason, regulations, such as leverage ratios, which employ balance sheetbased measures of leverage may fail to capture the actual use of leverage by
a hedge fund. 49 Long-Term Capital Fund demonstrates the failure of the
balance sheet leverage ratio to measure leverage. 150 It is now estimated that
Long-Term Capital's economic leverage was substantially higher than the
estimated on-balance sheet leverage ratio of fifty.' 5 '
In addition, hedge funds constantly change their holdings,' 52 and that
would require the regulators to examine the funds' portfolios "practically
minute by minute."' 153 It is hard to value non-balance sheet based leverage
ratios. 154 In addition, high capital requirements might create a perverse
141.
Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Speech at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island,
Georgia: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke2006O516a.htm.
142. Kambhu, supra note 64, at 45.
143.
GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 370.
144. Id.
145. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2000).
146. Donahue, supra note 133, at 266.
147. Eichengreen & Park, supra note 56, at 3-4.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 4-5.
151. Id.
152. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 372.
153. Id.
154.
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 12, at 24.
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incentive for funds to take additional risks in order to meet return targets on
the required capital.' 5557This would result in higher costs,
hedge funds offshore.

156

and drive some

Arguably, non-regulatory solutions provide a balance between the
benefits and risks of leverage. 58 These non-regulatory solutions include, for
example, counterparty discipline. 59 Counterparties, creditors, and investors
assess each other's ability to bear credit exposure.' 6° They limit the use of
leverage by requiring collateral, imposing trading limits, counterparty limits,
margin requirements, and "ongoing monitoring of credit quality."' 6' Yet,
even proponents of this solution admit that counterparty discipline often fails
to protect against failures, as the descriptions of the large hedge fund
disasters have demonstrated. 62 The near-collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management and the failures of the Bear Stearns funds are examples of
major failures in counterparty discipline. In the case of Long-Term Capital,
none of its investors, creditors, or counterparties provided an effective check
on the fund's activities or borrowing. 63 Further, a large part of Long-Term
Capital's lines of credit was unsecured.'64
In other cases, counterparty discipline may not be effective if "the
incentives or the means [for discipline] are lacking."1 65 Creditors might have
no incentive to discipline if a fund's "obligations are guaranteed by a
financially strong third party."' 66 During favorable economic conditions, the
incentives for discipline may become distorted. 67 Besides, retail investors
may lack the "means to accurately evaluate" the fund's risk level. 168 And
even when the incentives and means are not lacking, counterparty discipline
may fail because of the difficulty in measuring risk 69 and the rise in errors in
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evaluation and judgment
as happened in Long-Term Capital, Amaranth, and
170

the Bear Steams funds.

There are also proposals for enhanced disclosure as a means for
effectively controlling the use of leverage. The President's Working Group
recommended that hedge funds be required to submit additional and more
updated information to the public.' 71 Unless disclosure is made mandatory,
however, disclosure of certain hedge funds may be limited either because of
their stature or the reputation of its principals, as was the case of Long-Term
Capital. 172 To increase the current level of disclosure by hedge funds,
Congress must act. 173 Yet, even mandatory disclosure may not always
provide the meaningful information that will be necessary for creditors,
counterparties, and investors to assess risk. Balance sheets and income
statements may not accurately reveal the extent of the fund's risk and
175
exposure. 74 Hedge funds' positions and strategies change constantly.
Meaningful information would require continuously updated information that
accurately reflects off-balance sheet use of leverage.
VI. CONCLUSION

The solution suggested in this Article is not to regulate leverage, nor to
impose restrictions on hedge funds. The solution proposed here is to regulate
the main sources of hedge funds' leverage. The regulation need not cover all
sources so long as it covers the main sources. The regulation need not set up
limits on lending either. It should, however, introduce disincentives for the
lenders.
Regulated lenders, such as banks and broker dealers, should be required
to keep hedge fund borrowing on their balance sheet, and prohibit them from
selling the loans they made or covering their risks by any form of
derivatives, third party obligations, insurance, and any other mechanisms
currently available or in designed in the future.' 76 The regulators should be
granted authority to determine the level percentage of loans that should be
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covered by these limits, from 100% to not more than 50%, for example. That
permission would introduce some flexibility to the system but would be
linked to the amount of assets under hedge fund management. As to other
lenders, such as pension funds, a requirement for publicity could be imposed.
Let the public and the regulators know the extent to which the pension funds
have lent to hedge funds. In sum, the risk of such loans should remain with
the lenders and be either regulated or publicized! These measures might limit
the size of hedge funds and allow them to engage in risky investments
without threatening the financial system.
The guiding principle relating to hedge funds leverage should be: Keep
hedge funds small and relatively regulation-free to take investment risks. Let
hedge funds be financed by investors and lenders that can take care of their
own interests, and allocate their capital sources wisely.
However, the source of hedge funds' asset growth is the lenders mainly regulated lenders. Therefore, these lenders should be regulated with
respect to the funding of hedge funds. The following rule must apply to any
bank, any bank holding company and its subsidiaries, any entity that has a
relationship with a bank, except a borrowing relationship, and any brokerdealers. All these entities (and there may be others that should be added to
the list) may make loans to hedge funds directly or indirectly only if they
keep the loans on their balance sheets. Thus, the risks involved in these loans
may not be transferred to others or covered by derivatives of any kind. Loans
to hedge funds must stay on the lenders' books and, if so required by law carry loss reserves. No other rule is required. No changes should be made in
the regulation of the financial system as a whole, and no government
interference should be made in the trading or lending or investing. The
restriction is not very intrusive, since these actors in the financial system are
already subject to regulation including the requirement that they engage in
prudent lending. Hopefully, this restriction would dampen the growth of
hedge funds, leave them free to roam the field of the financial system,
innovate, succeed and fail, but never endanger the financial system.

